Merrill Lynch covered the Irish Banks disaster!

Image via Wikipedia

It just makes you wonder how many more concealed bubbles are ready to pop all over the world:







Merrill’s analyst Philip Ingram warned about the Irish Bank problems in advance and he was fired for ringing the alarm bell:

“The bank analyst who had been most prescient and interesting about the Irish banks worked for Merrill Lynch. His name was Philip Ingram. In his late 20s, and a bit quirky—at the University of Cambridge he had studied zoology—Ingram had done something original and useful: he’d shined a new light on the way Irish banks lent against commercial real estate.

The commercial-real-estate loan market is generally less transparent than the market for home loans. Deals between bankers and property developers are one-offs, on terms unknown to all but a few insiders. The parties to any loan always claim it is prudent: a bank analyst has little choice but to take them at their word. But Ingram was skeptical of the Irish banks. He had read Morgan Kelly’s newspaper articles and even paid Kelly a visit in his university office. To Ingram’s eyes, there undoubtedly appeared to be a vast difference between what the Irish banks were saying and what was really happening. To get at it he ignored what they were saying and went looking for knowledgeable insiders in the commercial-property market. He interviewed them, as a journalist might. On March 13, 2008, six months before the Irish real-estate Ponzi scheme collapsed, Ingram published a report, in which he simply quoted verbatim what British market insiders had told him about various banks’ lending to commercial real estate. The Irish banks were making far riskier loans in Ireland than they were in Britain, but even in Britain, the report revealed, they were the nuttiest lenders around: in that category, Anglo Irish, Bank of Ireland, and A.I.B. came, in that order, first, second, and third.

For a few hours the Merrill Lynch report was the hottest read in the London financial markets, until Merrill Lynch retracted it. Merrill had been a lead underwriter of Anglo Irish’s bonds and the corporate broker to A.I.B.: they’d earned huge sums of money off the growth of Irish banking. Moments after Phil Ingram hit the Send button on his report, the Irish banks called their Merrill Lynch bankers and threatened to take their business elsewhere. The same executive from Anglo Irish who had called to scream at Morgan Kelly called a Merrill research analyst to scream some more. Ingram’s superiors at Merrill Lynch hauled him into meetings with in-house lawyers, who toned down the report’s pointed language and purged it of its damning quotes from market insiders, including its many references to Irish banks. And from that moment everything Ingram wrote about Irish banks was edited, and bowdlerized by Merrill Lynch’s lawyers. At the end of 2008, Merrill fired him. One of Ingram’s colleagues, a fellow named Ed Allchin, was also made to apologize to Merrill’s investment bankers individually for the trouble he’d caused them by suggesting there was still money to be made on shorting Irish banks.

It would have been difficult for Merrill Lynch’s investment bankers not to know, at some level, that in a reckless market the Irish banks had acted with a recklessness all their own. But in the seven-page memo to Brian Lenihan—for which the Irish taxpayer forked over to Merrill Lynch seven million euros—they kept whatever reservations they may have had to themselves. “All of the Irish banks are profitable and well capitalised,” wrote the Merrill Lynch advisers, who then went on to suggest that the banks’ problem wasn’t at all the bad loans they had made but the panic in the market. The Merrill Lynch memo listed a number of possible responses the Irish government might have to any run on Irish banks. It refrained from explicitly recommending one course of action over another, but its analysis of the problem implied that the most sensible thing to do was guarantee the banks. After all, the banks were fundamentally sound. Promise to eat all losses, and markets would quickly settle down—and the Irish banks would go back to being in perfectly good shape. As there would be no losses, the promise would be free.”

So Merrill Lynch’s coverage of Irish banking, before the crisis, was dead on. And they threw their analyst under the bus to save their banking fees.

The rise of Corporatism !

The latest news on corporate merging are seeing on Sunday June 21st Xstrata, an Anglo-Swiss mining giant, proposing a “merger of equals” with Anglo American, a big London-based miner. The combined firm, worth some $70 billion, would become the world’s third-largest mining company.
After FIAT missed merging with Opel we are seeing a restructuring of the corporate world never seen before. Until 2007 such giant mergers would have been prevented from occurring due to anti-trust laws put in place exactly to avoid that a giant corporation can control a entire sector of the economy and potentially pose a systemic threat should it fall.
Anti trust laws are officially still there but it appears that everyone has forgot about them, there are no inquiries, no contrary voices, not even a doubt on the possible consequences of such consolidations.
The paradox of this story though is not Europe but USA.
USA was the inventor of anti-trust laws to prevent the abuses and dangers of the robber barons era when Rockfellers, Astors and company were de facto controlling the economy and consequently the country.
Anti-trust laws have always been at the forefront of the political discussion whenever a big merging was taking place, today is exactly the contrary, US government is not only taking equities in the corporations but dictating merging and acquisitions justified by the current economic crisis.
Chrysler forced to join FIAT, Bank of America forced to buy Merrill Lynch, these diktats unthinkable few years ago are common practice in the new economic scenario.
Of course, governments will tell us that all is for the greater good of the national economy, that is something they had to do, that they had no choice otherwise we would be now fighting for food scraps in the streets. I love when they use the apocalypse card!!
So now we have few key corporations in key sectors, equally leveraged or controlled by the governments, not competing against each other but many times joining forces to regulate the sector and control the flow of cash, and either controlled or having as stock holder the government.
First those companies controlled by the government have an unfair advantage against free companies, regardless of the good intentions and fair speeches, the government cannot afford to lose more money in unsuccessful business so if necessary will do its best to make revenue either tricking competition out or taking it out with a merger. First victim of the lack of competition and merit is the Free Market which is agonizing in USA.
The merging of corporations and state let us not forget is called Fascism. Benito Mussolini believed that fascism should have really been called corporatism, because corporatism is when government and business are intertwined.
Too much power is being concentrated in too few hands, we have been here before and it did not go well.
We created laws and rules to prevent this concentration of power from happening again and it is scary how few months of economic decline can let us all repudiate our principles and ideals.
The road to hell is paved with good intentions and we are definitely walking on it now.